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LEARNING BY DOING: THE FAILURE OF THE 1697 MALT LOTTERY-LOAN
According to Richards (1934-37, p. 57) , 170 State lotteries were issued in London between 1694 and 1826. Lotteries were thus part of the 1690s Financial Revolution and later continued to be an important source of State financing. However, in a series of successes, the failure of the second lottery in 1697 proves exceptional. Out of the 140,000 issued, only 1,763 tickets were sold. Although financial historians mention this failure, there never was a detailed analysis of it.
There are two objectives in this paper: first to show the emergence of the technical features of 'lottery-loans' between 1693 and 1697. Second, underscoring that, in order to be sold successfully, a financial instrument should be enticing for investors 1 . North & Weingast's thesis (1989) on the importance of the State debt being backed by Parliament and no longer by an unreliable king may be considered as a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the successful launching of a financial asset. And, in that respect, the 1697 failure presents an interesting case study.
The paper is organised in the following way: Section I shows that three lotteries granted their blueprints to the technical features of English State Lottery-Loans for more than a century. Section II and III analyse the 'bond' and 'lottery' features of the 1697 Malt Lotteryloan. Section IV details the strange solution of giving the Exchequer the unsold tickets to be used as cash. Section V measures the anticipated and the expected costs of the 1697 Malt Lottery-loan. Section VI explains the failure by the absence of the three prerequisites needed for a successful issue: financial features appealing for investors, both as regards the return and the redemption security, absence of other competing assets and an optimistic political and economic environment. Section VII summarises the findings of the paper in a brief conclusion.
I
First let us introduce a most remarkable man, Thomas Neale, a This position explains why Neale published extensively on coinage and different financial matters. He was interested in everything new, exciting and potentially profitable. Just between 1688 and his death in 1699, he was involved in no less than 39 projects, five of which concerned lotteries (Thomas, 1979, p. 269) .
His involvement in lotteries may be explained by another of his numerous official functions. In 1678, he was appointed Charles II's Groom Porter, an office he would hold until his death in 1699. As such, he was responsible for the comfort of the king's apartments, including the provision of cards and dices. He would also serve as referee whenever disputes would arise on cards or bowling matches. In his quality as Groom Porter, he was entitled to licence (in or out) gambling houses and to prosecute unlicensed ones.
These were hectic times with a furious craving for gambling. According to Dickson (1967, p. 45 Neale kept all the features of the Venetian lottery but with a much lower intake: only 10 per cent (as against 33 per cent). His lottery offered 50,000 tickets sold for 10 shillings each with 250 benefits ranging from £20 to £3,000. Thus, one benefit for 200 tickets was more generous than the one for 366 in Venice. This led to a more favourable expected value 4 of 8.92 shillings for a 10 shilling purchase as compared to the 1.32 ducat for a 2 ducats purchase in Venice.
At least six technical features of the English State Lottery-Loans were inherited from these two experiments: 1) It was open to natives as well as foreigners; 2) How subscription books should be made and organised; 3) The fact that tickets should be presented in three parts; 4) Two urns would be used for drawing: one for tickets sold with a number, and one for benefits and blanks; 5) As would become the custom, two special draws would receive a lot:
the first ticket drawn (besides the benefit which might come along with it) and the ticket drawn after the last ticket with a benefit (which terminated the draw); 6) If there were unsold tickets, the number of benefits and the total amount of prizes would be reduced in proportion.
This 1693 private lottery proved a real success. Besides its profitability, there was the respectability of the Groom Porter office and the security of eleven goldsmiths, among whom Sir Francis Child and Richard Hoare, who were responsible for collecting the purchases and paying the lots. Adventurers came from all ranks of society: from the Evelyn's coachman (who got a £40 lot) to aristocracy and courtiers. The climax being reached with the 1,000 tickets wager of Queen Mary herself (Thomas, 1979, pp. 271-2) .
In 1694, England had been at war with France for five years. 'The Augsburg
League' war was very costly. Constantly increasing existing taxes and creating new ones was not sufficient and the government badly needed more money. The success of Neale's lottery and his pleading in the Commons (Thomas 1979, p. 272) The innovation consisted in the financial instrument itself, 'a Lottery and a Loan'.
Indeed, the government was facing a dilemma 5 . On the one hand issuing a lottery would bring in a profit thanks to the craving of the times for gambling. On the other hand, some in society were strongly criticising private lotteries as can be seen from the draft in January 1693 of a one-clause bill intended to abolish lotteries 6 . The solution found shows Neale's ingenuity: no one would lose money, the lucky ones receiving a prize from the 'lottery' whereas the unlucky ones would receive a financial return from the 'loan'.
Being State-issued, the 'loan' granted some advantages to the subscriber. The most important one being the explicit appropriation of given taxes, here upon salt and beer (Sect.
XXXI) for paying the financial returns promised by the issue. Other advantages were: 1) If all tickets were not sold, the deficiency could be borrowed (at 8 per cent per annum); 2) The money lent was free of tax; 3) A financial advantage for quick payment (an unreasonable 14% rebate computed on the time between the subscription and the closing of the issue). Such a rate is very telling about the urgent needs of the Treasury.
The financial features of the Million Adventure were quite straightforward. 100,000
ten-pound tickets were issued. The advantages were twofold: as a 'loan', each ticket was entitled to receiving a one-pound annuity (i.e. 10 per cent) for 16 years. As a 'lottery', there were 2,500 prizes, each being a 16-years annuity ranging from £10 to £1,000. For the State, the yearly cost was £40,000 for prizes and £97,500 for blanks with a total of £137,500 during 16 years. The yield thus being 11.25 per cent. This 11.25 per cent figure is somewhat different from the 14 per cent advanced by Dickson (1967, pp. 48-49) 7 .
This scheme proved a huge success for the Treasury. Its 11.25 per cent cost was very favourable since it was much lower than the Treasury former financial operations: the sale of life-annuities at 14 per cent in 1693 8 and in 1694 9 (which eventually were reduced to 11.50
per cent by forced conversion).
Lotteries continued to be successful during the following years. In 1694 and 1695, Ann Murphy (2005, pp. 27-8) lists no less than 12 private lotteries, the prizes of which were either money or silver plates or physical goods. Between 1695 and 1696, Neale organised three successful lotteries (Thomas, 1979, p. 274) . In 1697, on the verge of bankruptcy, calling in Neale's expertise was thus the obvious choice for the Treasury. The more so since he had just suggested a new lottery scheme (Neale, 1696-97) which eventually became the blue-print for the new issue. As a further (standard) guarantee, if these amounts were not to be obtained, the "deficiency… shall be supplied and made good out of the First Aid to be granted in Parliament" (Sect. XXVI)
I I
The second part of the Act presents the "Clause of Loan for £1,400,000" (Sect. Just as in 1694, the instrument proved a hybrid between a bond and a lottery ticket. It had the two basic features of a bond: it bore an interest and it was redeemable.
However, these characteristics were somewhat unorthodox.
Section XXVIII stipulated that blanks would earn one farthing a day until redemption, which meant 365 farthings a year or £0.38. Thus the rate of interest seemed to be £0.38 divided by the ten pounds lent or 3.80 per cent. However, there was a subtle financial trap to it: instead of being a compound interest rate -to which we are accustomed -this interest rate was a simple, not compounded one. Thus the interest would prove inversely proportional to the period of investment since the yearly interest was not added up to the principal and previous interest payments for the calculus of the interest for the present year.
Presenting this perverse effect requests two assumptions: 1) The repayment extended over a 140 months period with 1,000 ticket-blocks paid by month (as explained below); 2) The Treasury was to receive the list of persons having won a prize by the end of August; we may thus suppose these repayments started in September. As blank tickets bore interest from 24 June 1697, repayments were then to take place from 24 September 1697 to 24 April 1709.
The table below shows the compound rate of interest actually received by an
Adventurer depending on the length of the period of his investment (the 'benefit', if any, not being taken into account). The second component of the asset, its redemption feature, presented some other rather unusual characteristics for there was no schedule showing any precise due dates of payment.
PLEASE PLACE
Blanks were to be reimbursed and prizes paid whenever the 1,000 tickets-block to which their numbers belonged were to be called for payment. The absence of a precise payment schedule is due to the fact payments were dependent on the taxes appropriated to this loan: ["Tickets shall be payable and be paid as soon as the same be raised and levied from and by the Fund aforesaid"].
Besides, the tax revenue had to be such as to pay for a full block of 1,000 tickets at a time: ["The said Duties upon Malt hereby granted should be applied to the Satisfaction of the said Tickets… so that as soon as there shall be sufficient to pay off the First Thousand Tickets"] (Sect. XXXIV).
This quotation seems to indicate that repayments were to take place every month. The more so as Section XXXV stipulated that the 1,000 tickets-block called for payment would be published in the press every first Monday of the month. The call for payment of the 140 tickets-blocks was very ingenious, as it was by draws.
Section XXXIV stipulated that before the very first draw, a preliminary draw would be made out of 140 tickets numbered from 1 to 140 in order to determine the order in which blocks of 1,000 tickets would be paid. Indeed, on the ticket number, the thousand figures were distinguished from the rest of the number so as to indicate which of the 140 blocks of 1,000 the ticket belonged to, the other figures indicating the number of the ticket within that block.
III
The second feature of the 1697 asset is its 'Lottery' characteristic. There were 3,500 prizes ('benefits') for the 140,000 tickets, which meant a one to 40 ratio 14 . The table below shows the prizes distribution.
Section XXXIII distinguished two groups of 'Fortunate Ticketts'.'Large' prizes, over £20, received their prizes without redemption or interest. 'Small' prizes of £20 and £10 received their prizes plus their ticket redemption and the interest due. (It is to be noted that this scheme granted the £20 prizes a better benefit than the £30 prizes: the prize plus redemption adding up to £30 to which the interest due was added. Thus, the repayment on the 140 th month meant a maximum of 4 ½ pounds interest). Besides, two PLEASE PLACE TABLE II NEAR HERE 'gratuities' of Venetian origin were kept: the first and last tickets drawn received an extra prize (respectively £150 and £100).
Section XXXIII stipulated that "The said Lottery (was) to be drawn on the 10
August 1697" (Section XXXII) and set forth how to proceed.
The text of the Act describing the management of the lottery followed the rules established by the The Million Adventure Act, the self same rules which were kept in force until the end of lottery-loans in 1826. During these 136 years, only minor changes were made in view of a better efficiency. In the Malt Lottery case, there was one single change. It concerned Box B which contained the Fortunate tickets (i.e. those granting a prize) and the blanks. In 1694, Box B contained as many tickets as had been subscribed, i.e. 100,000 tickets.
The draw proved awfully long, twelve days according to Murphy (2005, p. 12) were issued in cash-tickets. On 20 January 1698, the dukes of Southampton, Grafton and
Northumberland received £1,250 each, whereas the "Master of the Horse for extraordinaries of the Stables" received £3,000. As for remunerations, on 14 January 1697, £1,825 were paid to the Lord of the Privy Seal and 702£ 12sh 6d were paid to seven sergeants-at-arms… Board' refused to take them" (Ewen, 1932, p. 133) . The only persons who were happy with them were speculators. The detailed analysis of the ledgers of Sir Francis Child by Quinn (2001, pp. 604-5) shows very profitable (and rapid) operations on Malt tickets. Otherwise, it is rather surprising that a spontaneous market for so many blank tickets seem not to have emerged as had been the case for the Million Adventure's blank tickets (Murphy, 2005, p.26) .
Indeed, the best financial operation of the time was to buy a blank ticket with a heavy discount and hoard it until redemption. As the following Despite its bearing on only 5,000 tickets, the draw requested seven days. The following table
shows the number of prizes drawn on each day.
PLEASE PLACE TABLE IV NEAR HERE
As can be noted, only some 3,046 benefit tickets were drawn instead of the announced 3,500. Thus, as stated in the 1694 Lottery-Loan Act, the number and the amount of benefit tickets were reduced in due proportion to the sums collected. The reduction of 13.03 per cent suppressed 454 tickets.
V
Thanks to the figures at hand it is possible to measure the two main characteristics of the Lottery-Loan: its expected cost for the Treasury -or its equivalent, its expected return for the Adventurers -and its effective cost.
However, in both cases, there is the problem of a lack of payment schedule. The computation of a yield to maturity (as opposed to a return) requests knowing the precise dates for each payment. Since Section XXXV stated that each month "what Thousand Tickets are to be paid that Month" would be published, we induce that each month one single 1,000 tickets-block would be paid (payment of prizes, redemption of capital plus interest due).
According to our second assumption, monthly payments started on 24
September 1697, three months after 24 June, the date interest began to run.
Based on these two assumptions, measuring the expected cost of the "loan" component is a straightforward matter. 136,500 blanks paid £1m365. A monthly repayment of the principal over 140 months means 975 tickets or £9,750. To which must be added interest which increased with the number of passing months (but decreased with the redemption of tickets).
The yield obtained is 3.39 per cent over a 12 years period. This yield is far from the nominal rate of return of 3.80 per cent for the first year, the difference coming from the decrease in the compounded interest over time.
Measuring the expected cost of the "lottery' component is another story. Only estimates can be made due to two factors. First, the dates of prizes payments are not known since they depended on the order of payment of the blocks they belonged to. Second, and more importantly, the computation of the interest poses a problem. The interest of one farthing per day is computed on the purchase price of the ticket (ten pounds) and not on the prize obtained. Thus the interest due would be the same whatever the prize obtained. Further, 'large' prizes did not receive an interest, so that the Treasury would save the more as it paid them the later. For instance, if some 'large' prize was paid during the first month, the Treasury saved only 30 farthings whereas if payment took place on the last 140 th month, saving would amount to 4,322 farthings or four and a half pounds.
This may serve as a clue for estimating the two extreme figures of the Lottery-Loan cost: making three simulations as to the dates upon which 'large' and 'small' prizes might have been paid
19
. The process is as follows: 1) The 136,500 blanks are supposed to be redeemed (principal plus interest) by groups of 1,000 tickets-blocks over 140 months, excluding the months in which the prizes were paid in priority.
2) The 3,500 prizes were organised in 1,000 tickets-blocks and paid over three and a half months. Dickson (1967, pp. 48-49) , a figure which is obviously erroneous.
Paradoxically, the 1697 yield did not come from the relatively small amount of prizes used as an inducement for subscribing to the Lottery-Loan but from the amount of 'simple' interest.
The effective cost of this unsuccessful operation can also be measured thanks to the Parliamentary Report on the National Debt (1898). The table below shows the annual payments relative to the principal alone, i.e. the payments of the prizes and the tickets redemption. The figures relative to interest payments had to be estimated.
. This table is rich both in information and in unknowns. First, the Treasury seems not to have paid blocks of 1,000 tickets since no figure is a multiple of 1,000. The £180 annual payments in 1702 are unexplained and one may wonder if they represent a unique payment of three prizes: £100, £50 and £30? Besides, annual payments were uneven. During the first two years, payments were considerable and amounted to half the debt whereas there were years during which almost nothing was paid, before a complete stop in payments for four years, from 1703 to1707, due to the heavy expenditures of the war of the Spanish Succession. The second remaining half of the debt was repaid at an annual rate of 10-11 per cent from 1707 to 1710, with the balance finally paid in 1711. Thus, the total payment of the prizes and redemption of the blanks were spread over 14 years, a little more than the 11 and a half years originally considered by William III's Act.
An estimate of the effective cost of this Lottery-Loan can be made using some reasonable assumptions. The process used was as follows: 1) The prizes were reduced by 13 per cent. Such a reduction was applied to the amounts to be paid to the four types of tickets, 'large' prizes, £20 and £10 prizes and blanks; 2) The percentage effectively paid each year (columns three and six above) was applied to the four kinds of tickets. It 
VI
The reasons for this complete failure deserve to be explained. Dickson (1967, p. 57) says that it 'showed how desperate a financial crisis the government had stumbled into'. Murphy (2009, p. 63 ) says almost the same: '[it] was a powerful expression of the public's discontent'. We consider these two statements as too limited. Launching any large issue is always a delicate matter demanding at least three requirements, namely: a) offering appealing financial features (return and redemption); b) with an absence of competitive assets; c) and, psychologically, a surge for trust in the future amidst troubled times.
When the return on a financial asset is not proportional to its risks, the asset cannot be sold. As Ashton (1893) said in the foreword of his book: "With bad paper, one's best is impossible". Such was the case with the Malt Lottery. Both its 'bond' and its 'lottery' components offered too low a return.
The 'flag' of a lottery is its first prize. The £1,000 of the 1697 Lottery-Loan is a very poor prize compared to the first prizes of the two previous lotteries. Neale's 1693 lottery gave a prize immediately to be paid of £3,000 for a 10 shilling ticket, and the 1694 Lottery-Loan £1,000 during 16 years. Besides, the 1697 winner had to wait for a more or less long period of time before receiving his due
21
.
In order to measure the relative attractiveness of lotteries, it is possible to compute their 'expected value' which is the sum of the prizes obtainable (including zero) weighted by their respective probability. The Million Adventure expected value was £1-45sh-10d for 16 years, adding up to a cumulative nominal total of £22 for tickets costing £10. This would have appeared a good bargain making for success; but not so in 1697. The Malt Lottery expected value was only 12£ 11sh 2d, i.e. the redemption amount (£10) and a meagre £21/2 as interest 22 .
As for the 'bond' component of the Malt 'loan', considering that the third rule for the success of an issue is to offer more than other available assets, the 1697 issue offered less, a very low 3.39 per cent (3.91 per cent if the lottery component was taken into account) . This 8 per cent figure can thus be used as a benchmark.
However, the actual rate of interest was much higher. Two contemporaries, Sir Francis
Child (Customers Ledgers…) and Oldmixton (1735, p.150) both say that bank-notes were valued with a 20 per cent discount and that some English funds bore a 40 to 60 per cent discount. With such investment opportunities, a paper yielding less than 4 per cent would have some difficulty being willingly purchased.
The third reason for the Malt Lottery failure was the uncertainty as to redemption dates.
On this account, we consider North and Weingast (1989) are basically right -the transfer of the financial power authority from the King to Parliament was revolutionary -but this must not be considered as the whole story since the actual features of an issue are of paramount importance for its success.
The uncertainty as to redemption dates was due to four factors, the major one being the fact that the Million Adventure subscribers were not receiving their annuities and were petitioning Parliament. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Charles Montagu, wrote to his friend William Blathwayt: "I was always fearful of the success of a new Lottery when the old tickets were not pay'd but wee must make the best wee can of it" (Murphy, 2005, p. 9) . This was an awkward situation 26 owing to the fact that Parliament had suppressed the King's power to renege his financial commitments but was not able to enforce its Own
27
. In fact (and this was the second uncertainty factor), the Million Adventurers were not the sole investors not being paid. Actually just before the Malt Lottery issue, Parliament had been faced with the fact that estimates of tax revenue made for 15 previous issues proved largely overestimated, leading to a deficit of £5 million (cf. note 25 above).Therefore it was not to be considered a good omen for the Malt Lottery guarantee and it forced Parliament to legislate again at the beginning of 1698, although too late since the draw had already taken place. The 8 and 9 William III-C8 Act ordered once more that any revenue coming from the tax upon malt be used in priority for payments to the Malt Lottery and, as mentioned above, it increased its interest from 1 to 2 farthings a day.
The third uncertainty factor concerned more astute investors. The Malt Act specified that the new malt tax was to be in force for (only) 2 years and 3 months (Sect. I). It was thus obvious that the State could not collect £1,400,000 in 27 months. Had it been possible, the State would have had no need for issuing a Lottery-Loan. This calendar may have resulted from the Parliament's reluctance for long-term financing which probably was a way to control the King's expenditures
28
. Practically, it meant that the 1697 investors had to trust Parliament would extend the collection of the taxes appropriated to them.
The fourth uncertainty factor -though a minor one -was the lack of a precise redemption schedule due to its being dependent on tax revenue.
Our third requirement for a successful issue is linked to the economic and political environment. States launch large issues because they need ready money (most often due to the waging of wars). Thus, issues are made in times of crisis which, by definition, are not favourable to subscriptions. So, two things are needed: first and foremost an appeal to patriotic feelings, and second, a surge of optimism for the near future. The difference with Dickson comes from a confusion between nominal cost ($140 000 -constituting the yearly fund -divided by £ one million) and the yield cost figure we arrive at when taking into account the precise date for each payment and the actual cost: $137 500 and not $140 000. A similar mistake was made by Cohen (1953, p. 24 ) who advanced 11.50% because he too used £140,000 as annual annuity payments. 12 This may certainly be linked with the Great Recoinage -of which Neale was responsible as Director of the Mint-which had started in December 1695. 13 Consequently, for computing the expected cost of the 1697 issue, we will assume that 1 000 tickets are reimbursed every month.
14 This was the 1694 ratio which was to become the standard. 15 The official figure is £1,217,639 collected by the State (Parliamentary Papers…, 1898).
16 About the deficit of 18,237 tickets, two outcomes were probably used: 1) Part of them (9,778) was delivered to the Exchequer in 1698 (Public Income and Expenditure, 1898, p. 483); 2) The remaining 8,459 tickets were 'annulled' and were replaced by tallies at 8% (Act, Sect. XLIV). 17 The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Montagu, took that idea (and the full credit for it) for himself under the form of Exchequers Bills -the first issue of which proved a failure (cf. www. historyofparliamantonline.org/volume/1690-1715/member/neale-thomas 1641-99).
18 Letters in Calendar of Treasury Books, 1697 (1933 . These two letters totaled 11,034£ 18sh 4d to be paid representing 1,103 lottery tickets. With a 1 Fortunate for 40 tickets ratio, these 1,103 tickets should have produced around 27 Fortunate tickets. Where they were?
19 For the sake of shortness, Appendix 1 detailing the three processes was suppressed. It is available from the authors.
20 Act: 10 William-C10. 21 The only technical way for comparing these two "First prizes" is to compute their "present value" -i.e. the sum of their discounted cash-flows. In 1697 the alternative was to subscribe to tallies at 8%, the rate used for discounting the cash-flows. Murphy (2009, p.55sq ) is highly critical of the Parliament's inexperience and mismanagement of the financial affairs during the 1690's. 28 Professor Felix (University of Reading) told us that the Parliament systematically granted the Navy's subsidies lower than her known needs. According to him, it was "to keep a hand over the King's budget". The same in Dickson (1967 , p.348) and Murphy (2009, p 56 sq) . ------------------------ (1697) *Missing information. It is estimated by the difference between the total benefit tickets drawn and the number of known tickets drawn. -
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